If UK Army was a sword it'd be blunt - it is imperative we sharpen up our forces

Since 1990, the regular Army has reduced in size from 155,000 troops to 75,000. It contracted from eight armoured and four infantry brigades, to two armoured and three infantry brigades - shrinking by almost 60%. And the ever smaller UK defence industry lacks the size, political support and influential lobbies of the shipbuilding and aerospace industries because of continual diminishment of the defence budget and the Army's share of it, together with bungled equipment programmes.

Successive governments were content with all this until the 2022 Russian attack on Ukraine forced Whitehall to face the "inconvenient truth" that the Army is less modernised than the Royal Navy or RAF, with much fighting equipment either obsolete or getting there. This was worsened by donation of Army weapons to Ukraine, such as all its AS90 medium artillery.

Last year, the Commons' Defence Committee uncovered shocking shortages of combat supplies, medical support and training. And Defence Secretary John Healy stated that, while the armed forces were able to conduct peacetime operations, such as evacuations, they lacked the necessary capabilities to fight a war.

In 1995, the Army deployed 10,000 troops to the NATO force enforcing Bosnia's fragile peace. These were fully combat trained and well supported by logistic and medical units and supplies.

But in 2025, it seems unlikely the Army could rapidly send a similar combat-capable force to Ukraine. Indeed, if you think of the Army as a sword, not only has its cutting edge become blunted, but the blade itself is rusting away.

But its weight, heft and cutting edge can be restored - by funding. This year's Strategic Defence Review promises a high-tech "integrated force", ready by 2035.

But currently any Army formations sent on combat operations would be much less capable than they need to be, with a real risk of incurring avoidable casualties.

And should they be defeated, the Army and nation would not get a second chance. The first priority for the Army is to be able to "fight tonight". This should be the MoD's main effort.

We need a much sharper short-term focus on making the Army ready for war, with the equipment it has now, in no more than three years. This means the unglamorous, but vital, purchase of ammunition and spare parts, as a priority.

Army plans to purchase more drones should be accelerated - as should the stripping away of risk-averse bureaucratic rules that frustrate realistic training. The Iraq and Afghan wars showed us the British public would not tolerate avoidable casualties. So the Army's medical capability must be rapidly rebuilt as well.

All of this must be tied together and demonstrated in more field exercises at brigade level and above. The Army Reserves should too be much more integrated with the Regular Army, especially its operational plans and exercises.

This was achieved in the Cold War. It can be achieved again. Neither the Regular Army nor Army Reserves are fully manned.

More than any glossy recruiting campaign, restoring readiness and increasing training and exercise levels would boost morale, as well as the sense of professional purpose and confidence among troops, thereby improving retention and recruiting.

In addition, the Army must continue planning to "fight tomorrow". Army chief General Sir Roly Walker has an ambitious vision to make increasing use of drones, artificial intelligence and deep strike weapons to triple the Army's lethality.

The Defence Review called for the Army to "increase lethality tenfold". It did not set out any evidence this was achievable. This merely seems like a spin doctor's overblown optimism.

Rather than entangle its future in hollow soundbites, the MoD should do everything it can to empower the Army and unleash the creativity, ingenuity and fighting spirit of its people.

An exciting Experimentation Taskforce is already exploring new ways of fighting with emerging technology. And much-needed modernisation of fighting equipment, including Ajax, Boxer and Challenger upgrades, is funded.

But important capability gaps remain. For the Army to succeed over the next decade will require much more than good luck; it will need leadership, support and, above all, a demonstrable sense of urgency from No 10, the MoD and the Treasury.

• Brigadier (Rtd) Ben Barry is the author of The Rise and Fall of the British Army, 1975-2025, published in audio and hardback by Osprey, and a fellow at the International Institute for Strategic Studies